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Abstract
This paper is a rst step in investigating the competitive and welfare e¤ects of
behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD) in markets where rms have informa-
tion to employ retention strategies as an attempt to avoid the switching of their
clientele to a competitor. We focus on retention activity in the form of a discount
o¤ered to a consumer expressing an intention to switch. When retention strate-
gies are allowed, forward looking rms anticipate the e¤ect of rst period market
share on second period prots and price more aggressively in the rst-period. Thus,
rst period equilibrium price under BBPD with retention strategies is below its
non-discrimination counterpart. This contrasts with rst period price above the
non-discrimination level if BBPD is used and retention activity is forbidden. Re-
garding second period prices, the use of retention o¤ers increase the price o¤ered
to those consumers who do not signal am intention to switch; the reverse happens
to those consumers who decide to switch after being exposed to retention o¤ers.
As in other models where consumers have stable exogenous brand preferences, the
instrument of BBPD is bad for prots and welfare but good for consumers. BBPD
with the additional tool of retention activity boosts consumer surplus and overall
welfare but decreases industry prot.
An early version of this paper was prepared to the Ofcom Workshop on the Economics of Switch-
ing Costs, January 2010. I thank the workshop participants especially Geo¤rey Myers and Khaled
Diaw. Thanks for comments on an early version of this paper are also due to Patrick Rey, Rune Sten-
backa and participants of the 2010 EARIE Conference.This work was nanced by FEDER funds through
the Operational Programme for Competitiveness Factors - COMPETE and National Funds through
FCT - Foundation for Science and Technology under the projects PTDC/EGE-ECO/108784/2008 and
PTDC/EGE-ECO/111558/2009.
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1 Introduction
In markets with repeated purchases rms frequently use the consumerspurchase history
to quote di¤erent prices to their own previous customers and to those who bought from
a rival before. When price discrimination is permitted and trade among consumers is
not feasible, rms may want to price low to poach their rivals customers and price high
to their own customers. This form of price discrimination, termed behavior-based price
discrimination (henceforth BBPD), sometimes also called price discrimination based on
purchase history or dynamic pricing, is widely observed in many markets. In the com-
munications markets, for instance, rms frequently o¤er a lower price to a customer who
has been using a competitors service. Similar pricing strategies are employed in other
markets such as supermarkets, web retailers, credit cards, banking services and electricity
and gas.1
Although this type of competitive price discrimination has received much attention
in the economics literature in recent years,2 the literature has hitherto focused on the
assumption that rms do no react to the rivalspoaching o¤ers. Interestingly, in some of
the markets where rms often discriminate between their own and the rivalsconsumers,
the use of retention o¤ers as an attempt to avoid customer poaching and switching has
become a widespread business practice. A recent report by the regulator and competition
authority for the UK communications industries (Ofcom, 2010) refers that retention o¤ers
have been increasingly used by rms operating in markets in which the switching process
is the Losing Provider Led (LPL). The LPL regime is currently in place in the UK for
switching mobile telephony or broadband services and operates as follows. Consumers
wishing to switch their mobile telephony services must contact their existing provider and
request a Porting Authorization Code (PAC) which they must communicate to their new
provider in order to complete the switch.3 The same procedure also applies for switching
broadband services, in which case the required code is the Migrations Authorization Code
(MAC).
1A recent report by the O¢ ce of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem (2008)), the regulator for
Britains gas and electricity industries, has revealed that, in this industry: (i) a substantial fraction of
consumers are switchersin the sense that they constantly seek out for the best deal in the market; and
(ii) suppliers are well aware of these consumersdynamics and do take them into account in their pricing
decisions. In particular, companies charge more to existing (sticky) customers whilst maintaining
competitiveness in more price sensitive segments of the market.
2Chen (2005), Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2007) and Esteves (2009b) present updated literature
surveys on BBPD.
3For mobile services a PAC code is required only when the consumer wants to keep his existing
telephone number when switching to the new provider.
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Therefore, apart from being able to know whether or not a consumer purchased from
a rival before, rms can have the tools to price discriminate between di¤erent types of old
customers those disclosing a desire to switch (called active consumers) and those show-
ing no intention to switch (called passive consumers). Empowered with this additional
information rms can have the last word over their competitorspoaching o¤ers. The
consumers request of a code discloses information about his willingness to switch and
gives rms an incentive to use retention o¤ers targeted to customers who are at a risk of
switching. Theoretically rms can use diverse forms of retention o¤ers price discounts,
price matching, upgrade of services as a way to make it less attractive for a customer
to switch to a competing rm. However, according to the Ofcom report (2010, p.82)
retention activity in the UK communications industry is generally in the form of a price
discount.
The ability of rms to employ retention strategies will make it more di¢ cult for rms
to attract the rivalscustomers and will potentially raise welfare and antitrust concerns.
Some interesting issues are the following. What is the likely impact of retention on com-
petition and consumers? Do rms charge excessive pricesto passive consumers? Does
BBPD with retention o¤ers enhance the dominance of the rm with a higher customer
base? Who benets and who loses when rms engage in BBPD with retention o¤ers?
Should these business practices be banned?
Despite the crucial importance of these issues, the answer to these and other related
questions is not yet known. This paper takes a rst step in investigating the competitive
and welfare e¤ects of retention o¤ers in markets where rms engage in BBPD. The paper
considers a two-period model with two horizontally di¤erentiated rms competing for con-
sumers with stable exogenous brand preferences across the two periods. These preferences
are specied in the Hotelling-style linear market of unit length with rms positioned at
the endpoints. Firms cannot commit to future prices. In the rst-period rms charge a
uniform price. In the second-period there are two stages. In the rst stage, rms use the
consumersrst period purchase history to draw inferences about their preferences and
price accordingly. Each rm simultaneously chooses a price to its old customers and to
the rivals previous customers. In the second stage, it is assumed that a retention discount
is targeted at consumers expressing an intention to leave and is enabled by a switching
process in which a provider is made aware of a customers intention to switch before the
switching takes place (LPL process).
In order to investigate e¤ects of retention o¤ers when rms also employ BBPD, I rst
present the benchmark case where BBPD is permitted but retention o¤ers are not allowed,
either because they are not permitted or because rms cannot recognize the customers
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who are at risk of switching. This benchmark is useful to understand the competitive and
welfare implications of BBPD in markets operating under di¤erent switching regimes.
With regard to the communications sector, the Ofcom report states that an alternative
to the LPL switching regime, also in place in the UK, is the Gaining Provider Led (GPL)
process which applies, for instance, to switching xed telephony lines. Under the GPL
regime, the consumer agrees a deal with the new provider before the losing provider is
informed that the switch is in process. In contrast to the LPL regime, the GPL switching
process does not allow rms to target counter-o¤ers to consumers willing to switch because
by the time the existing provider becomes aware of the consumers intention to switch,
the consumer has already signed the contract with a competitor.
The second-period static analysis sheds some light on the price e¤ects of BBPD with
retention counter-o¤ers given an inherit market share. I show that rms will only engage
in BBPD with retention o¤ers when their customer base is above a threshold, i.e., when it
is higher than 33%. The analysis also sheds light on whether or not BBPD with retention
strategies can help a dominant rm (with a market share above 50%) to maintain its
dominance. The model predicts that when BBPD is permitted but retention o¤ers are
not allowed, the dominant rm will lose its dominance under BBPD. A similar result is
obtained in Gehrig et al. (2013). In contrast, if BBPD and retention o¤ers are both
permitted the model predicts that when the dominant rm is big enough, i.e., with a
market share above 75%, although BBPD with retention activity reduces its dominance
the rm can still maintain the dominant position (i.e., a market share above 50%).
While the static analysis is a useful tool, the dynamic analysis is the most appropriate
to advise competition authorities. The paper shows that BBPD with retention o¤ers
gives rise to new dynamic e¤ects. While under BBPD with no retention, the rst-period
equilibrium price is above the non-discrimination level, the reverse happens under BBPD
with retention discounts. Regarding the second-period equilibrium prices, compared to a
GPL regime with BBPD and no retention prices, the model predicts that the LPL regime
with BBPD and retention leads to higher prices to all consumers that do not switch, be
they passive consumers or consumers that were successfully retained after they expressed
a desire to switch by requesting a code.
The welfare analysis shows that industry prots are lower and consumerssurplus and
welfare are higher under the LPL regime with BBPD and retention o¤ers than under the
GPL with BBPD and no retention. The reason is that the lower second period prices for
those consumers that switch and the decrease in the rst-period price for all consumers
more than compensate the higher prices for those consumers that do not switch. Retention
o¤ers boost welfare because the number of consumers who switch away from their preferred
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product is lower than in the case where retention activity is absent.
This paper is related to the literature on competitive price discrimination,4 especially
the literature on behavior-based price discrimination. 5 Like other forms of price discrim-
ination, BBPD can raise competition and welfare concerns. While in the switching cost
approach purchase history discloses information about exogenous switching costs (e.g.
Chen (1997) and Taylor (2003)), in the brand preference approach purchase history dis-
closes information about a consumers exogenous brand preference for a rm (e.g. Villas-
Boas (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)). A common nding in this literature is that
BBPD tends to intensify competition, potentially benet consumers and reduce prots
in duopoly models where (i) the market exhibits best response asymmetry,6 (ii) rms are
symmetric and (iii) both have information to price discriminate (e.g. Chen (1997), Villas-
Boas (1999), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Taylor (2003) and Esteves (2010)). There
are, however, some models where rms can benet from BBPD. This can be the case
when rms are asymmetric (e.g. Sha¤er and Zhang (2000)), when rmstargetability is
imperfect and asymmetric (Chen et al. (2001)) and when only one of the two rms has
information to price discriminate (Chen and Zhang (2009) and Esteves (2009)). Finally,
the paper is related to Gehrig et al. (2012) who investigate the e¤ects of BBPD in a static
asymmetric duopoly model, where one of the rms is assumed to have an inherited domi-
nant market position (market share larger than 50%). They show that uniform pricing is
a more powerful instrument than BBPD for the dominant rm to defend its market share
advantage.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
presents the benchmark case where rms can employ BBPD but retention o¤ers are not
allowed. Section 4 presents the equilibrium analysis and Section 5 provides the welfare
analysis. Section 6 concludes and the appendix collects the proofs that were omitted from
the text.
4Comprehensive surveys on competitive price discrimination are presented by Armstrong (2006) and
Stole (2007).
5Chen (2005), Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2007) and Esteves (2009b) present updated literature
surveys on BBPD.
6Following Corts (1998), the market exhibits best response asymmetry when one rms strong
market is the others weakmarket.
7For other recent papers on BBPD and customer recognition see also Chen and Pearcy (2010), Esteves
and Vasconcelos (2014), Esteves and Reggiani (2014), Gehrig et al (2011), (2012), Shy and Stenbacka
(2013).
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2 Model
Two rms A and B produce at zero marginal cost nondurable goods A and B.8 There are
two periods, 1 and 2. The total number of consumers in the market is normalized to one.
In each period, each consumer wishes to buy a single unit from either rm A or B and
is willing to pay at most v: The reservation value v is su¢ ciently high so that nobody
stays out of the market. Like in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) consumers have exogenous
preferences for brands that are present from the start. Consumer preferences are specied
in the Hotelling-style linear market of unit length with rms positioned at the endpoints.
A consumer brand preference, ; is uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and is xed over the
two periods of consumption.9 A consumer located at  incurs total cost pA + t when
buying from rm A at price pA, and incurs total cost pB + t(1   ) when buying from
B at price pB. In the brand preference approach t > 0 measures how much a consumer
dislikes buying a less preferred brand.
Firms are not able to observe the brand preference of individual consumers. However,
in the second-period, each rm can use the information about consumersrst period
purchase decisions to infer whether they prefer its brand or the rivals one and price
accordingly. In the rst-period price discrimination is not feasible, therefore each rm
sets a single price. Suppose that at any pair of rst-period prices such that all consumers
purchase and both rms have positive sales, there will be a rst-period cuto¤ 1 such
that all consumers on the interval [0; 1] buy from A and all consumers on the interval
[1; 1] buy from rm B. When rms cannot commit to future prices, in the second period,
each rm will o¤er one price to its own past customers and a di¤erent one to those who
purchased from their rival before (or, new customers).10
Now I extend the body of the literature on BBPD by assuming that in the second-
period there is a two-stage competition game. Like in the extant models, in the rst
stage, each rm simultaneously chooses a price to its own past customers, poi ; and a price
to the new customers, pni ; i = A;B: After consumers have observed its current supplier
price, poi ; and the new supplier price, p
n
j ; some of them might be willing to switch. As
aforementioned, under a LPL switching regime, consumers with an intention to switch
8The assumption of zero marginal costs can be relaxed without altering the basic nature of the results
derived throughout the model.
9For a model of BBPD with imperfect correlated preferences across periods see Chen and Pearcy
(2010).
10Because we are assumingg that all consumers buy in period 1 and that no new customers enter the
market in period 2, a customer who bought from rm j in period 1 is a new customer to rm i in period
2.
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must go through a validation process with its existing supplier, a proof of which must be
provided to the new supplier in order to complete the switch. This creates an opportunity
for rms to segment their customers base between those who are willing to switch and
those who are not, and try to retain the rst group of consumers before they can sign
any agreement with a competitor. Retention strategies are used as an attempt to make
it less attractive for a customer to switch to a rival rm. Although rms may use diverse
forms of retention o¤ers e.g., price discounts, price matching, upgrade of services this
paper focuses only on retention activity in the form of a xed price discount targeted to a
consumer expressing an intention to switch. Thus, in the second stage, it is assumed that
each rm o¤ers each customer disclosing an intention to leave (e.g, by requesting a PAC
or MAC)11 a secret xed discount named di: Moreover, it is assumed that consumers do
not blu¤, i.e., only those consumers with economic reasons to switch will disclose their
willingness to switch to the current supplier. Firms and consumers use the same discount
factor :
3 BBPD with no retention
Consider rst the benchmark in which BBPD is permitted but retention o¤ers are not
allowed in period 2. This may occur either because the switching process in place does
not allow rms to distinguish, in their base of previous customers, those who are looking
to switch (active consumers) and those who are not (passive consumers); or because
retention o¤ers are not permitted. Throughout the analysis, it is considered that active
customers are those who show an intention to switch by requesting, for instance, a code
to complete the switching; while passive customers are those who are not willing to switch
(with strong preferences for a given rm).
As mentioned in the Introduction, with regard to the UK communications sector, an
alternative to the losing provider led (LPL) switching regime, is the gaining provider
led (GPL) process which applies, for instance, to switching xed telephony lines. In
contrast to the LPL, the GPL regime does not allow rms to make countero¤ers to
consumers willing to switch because by the time the existing provider becomes aware of
the consumers intention to switch, the consumer has already signed the contract with a
competitor.
11In the UK consumers wishing to switch their mobile telephony services must contact their existing
provider and request a Porting Authorisation Code (PAC) which they must communicate to the new
provider in order to complete the switch. The same procedure is applied for switching broadband services,
in which case the required code is the Migrations Authorisation Code (MAC).
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This benchmark is useful to advise competition policy agencies with regard to (i)
the competitive and welfare implications of BBPD in markets operating under di¤erent
switching regimes and (ii) the likely impact of retention o¤ers on prices, prots and
consumer welfare in comparison to the case where this practice is forbidden or not feasible.
The analysis of BBPDwith no retention strategies (under the GPL switching regime) is
based on the simplied version of Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) with consumer preferences
uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1].
Let the superscript NR denote no retention.
Proposition 1. When rms can price discriminate between old and new customers
but retention o¤ers are not allowed, second period equilibrium prices are:
(i) If 1  14 :
po;NRA = t (1  21) ; pn;NRA =
1
3
t (3  41)
po;NRB =
1
3
t (3  21) ; pn;NRB = 0:
(ii) If 1
4
 1  34 :
po;NRA =
1
3
t (21 + 1) ; p
n;NR
A =
1
3
t (3  41) ;
po;NRB =
1
3
t (3  21) ; pn;NRB =
1
3
t (41   1) :
(iii) If 1  34 :
po;NRA =
1
3
t (21 + 1) ; p
n;NR
A = 0;
po;NRB = t(21   1); pn;NRB =
1
3
t (41   1) :
Proof. See the Appendix.
In order to shed some light about the impact of BBPD when rms depart with an
inherited exogenous base of customers, let s2;NRi , i = A;B; denote rm i second period
market share (with BBPD and no retention) given rm As inherited market share equal
to 1:
Corollary 1. When 1 = 12 , rms will share equally the market in period 2. However,
if 1 > 12 then s
2;NR
A <
1
2
and s2;NRB >
1
2
: The reverse happens when 1 < 12 :
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The previous corollary shows that if rms depart with an equal base of customers, they
will share equally the market in period 2. In contrast, if rms depart with asymmetric
inherited market shares, then BBPD with no retention destroys the dominance of the
larger rm. Specically, the smaller rm will become the leader while the larger rm will
become the smaller one. A similar result is obtained in Gehrig et al. (2012), who conclude
that uniform pricing is a more powerful instrument than BBPD for the dominant rm
to defend its market share advantage. This static analysis will be useful to draw some
conclusion about the e¤ects of BBPD in an industry where one of the rms can use
retention o¤ers to defend its dominance.
Now look at rst-period price competition. Let p1i represent rm is rst-period price,
i = A;B: Following Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) we can established the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 2. When BBPD is permitted and retention is not allowed, there is a
symmetric subgame perfect nash equilibrium in which:
(i) First-period equilibrium prices are p1;NR = t
 
1 + 
3

and the rst-period market is
split symmetrically with 1;NR = 1
2
.
(ii) Second-period equilibrium price for old and new customers are, respectively, po;NR =
2
3
t and pn;NR = 1
3
t:
(iii) In period 2, consumers on the intervals

0; 1
3

and

2
3
; 1

do not switch and con-
sumers on the interval

1
3
; 2
3

switch to a new supplier.
(iv) Each rms overall prot is equal to NR = t(9+8)
18
:
4 BBPD with retention strategies
As aforementioned I now assume that in the second period apart from being able to
distinguish their own previous customers and those who bough from the rival before (new
customers), rms have the tool to recognize, in their base of previous customers, those
who are at risk of switching. Firms can now use retention o¤ers as an attempt to make
it less attractive for a customer to switch to a competing rm. We look at retention
activity in the form of a price discount o¤ered to a consumer showing an intention to
switch. The use of a retention price discount is also a form of price discrimination based
on consumersbehavior (in this case the request of a code to complete the switch). This
form of retention activity is not price discrimination between old and new customers
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(as in the existing models of BBPD), but rather between di¤erent types of a rms old
consumers (those who are willing to switch and those who are not).
With that in mind the game is solved working backward from the second period.
4.1 Second-period
Suppose that the rst period prices lead to a cuto¤ 1 2 [0; 1] such that a consumer
located at 1 is indi¤erent between buying from A and B in period 1. With no loss of
generality, look at rm As turf on [0; 1] : Some of rm As rst-period consumers might
be willing to switch to B given the observed second period prices fpoA; pnBg. Under a LPL
switching regime, these consumers will need to contact the current provider (rm A) and
request a code (e.g., PAC or MAC) to complete the switching process to rm B. It is the
request of this code that allows rm A to get back to them with a secret retention price
discount dA. Thus, in the second-stage of period 2, the indi¤erent consumer between
staying with A after being exposed to a retention campaign and switching to B is located
at A, such that
A =
1
2
+
pnB   poA + dA
2t
: (1)
In the group of rm As own customers, the indi¤erent consumer between being passive
and active is located at cA such that
cA =
1
2
+
pnB   poA
2t
:
A similar reasoning is applied to derive the location of the indi¤erent consumer between
being passive and active, namely cB in the group of customers who bough from B in period
1, those on the interval [1; 1] :
Given the existence of a rst-period cuto¤, the second-period situation is as depicted
in Figure 1: Consumers to the left of 1 lie in rm As turf and those to the right lie in
rm Bs. On rm As turf part consumers to the left of cA are passive, active consumers
on the interval [cA; 1] are retained (those located at the interval [
c
A; 1]); while those on
the interval [A; 1] do in fact switch to rm B even thought they have been exposed to a
retention o¤er.
In the second stage rm A and B solve, respectively, the following problem:
Max
dA
(poA   dA) (A   cA) ; (2)
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A B
1q
A’s turf B’s turf
Aq
c
Aq cBqBq
0
1
Retained Switch to BPassive Switch to A Retained Passive
Max
dB
(poB   dB) (cB   B) : (3)
It is straightforward to obtain that the price discount o¤ered by rm A and B is, respec-
tively, dA =
poA
2
and dB =
poB
2
: With no loss of generality look on rm As turf. In the
rst-stage of period 2, rm A and B solve respectively:
Max
poA
oA = p
o
A
c
A + (p
o
A   dA)(A   cA);
Max
pnB
nB = p
n
B (1   A) :
A similar reasoning is applied to rm Bs turf on the interval [1; 1].
Proposition 3. When rms can employ BBPD and retention o¤ers the second period
equilibrium prices and prots are:
(i) If 1  13 :
poA = t (1  21) ; pnA =
2t
5
(2  31)
poB =
2t
5
(3  21) ; dB = t
5
(3  21) ; pnB = 0:
2A = t (1  21) 1 +
2t
25
(31   2)2 (4)
2B =
3t
50
(21   3)2 (5)
(ii) If 1
3
 1  23 :
poA =
2t
5
(21 + 1) ; dA =
t
5
(21 + 1) ; p
n
A =
2t
5
(2  31)
poB =
2t
5
(3  21) ; dB = t
5
(3  21) ; pnB =
2t
5
(31   1) :
2A =
t
50
 
4821   361 + 19

(6)
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2B =
t
50
 
4821   601 + 31

(7)
(iii) If 1  23 :
poA =
2t
5
(21 + 1) ; dA =
t
5
(21 + 1) ; p
n
A = 0
poB = t(21   1); pnB =
2t
5
(31   1) :
2A =
3t
50
(21 + 1)
2 (8)
2B = (1  1) t(21   1) +
2
25
t (31   1)2 (9)
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is interesting to note that a rms will only employ a retention strategy if its customer
base is above a threshold. Considering, for instance, the case of rm A, we observe that
it will only o¤er a retention discount its rst period market share is larger than 1
3
: It is
also interesting compare the equilibrium retention discount obtained 50% of the second
period current price to old customers ; with existing empirical evidence. Considering
the Ofcom report (2010, p.82), we nd that retention discounts generally vary between
32% and 60% of the current price in mobile telephony and between 25% and 44% of the
current price in broadband services.
Before proceeding to the analysis of competition in period 1, we next try to draw
some conclusions about the competitive e¤ects of BBPD with and without retention in
an industry where rms would depart with an inherited exogenous market share. With
no loss of generality consider the case of rm A. From Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 it
is straightforward to obtain the following result.
Corollary 2. Comparing the second-period prices of BBPD with and without reten-
tion strategies:
(i) rm As passive consumers pay higher prices with retention o¤ers when 1 > 13 :
(ii) rm As retained consumers pay higher prices when 1 < 47 ; while they pay a
lower price when 1 > 47 .
(iii) rm As price to new customers with retention strategies is always below its coun-
terpart when this activity is banned.
Figure 2 illustrates the second-period equilibrium prices given an inherited market
share with and without retention strategies in rm As turf A assuming that t = 1.
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Figure 1: Second-period prices with and without retention strategies
Corollary 2 suggests that it is important to take into account whether one of the
rms has a dominant position in the market when trying to understand the competitive
e¤ects of retention o¤ers. Considering for instance the case of rm A, we observe that
its existing consumers pay the same price with and without retention activity when rm
A has a smaller market share, specically when 1  14 . At an interior solution (not
too strong asymmetry between rms), we observe that because rms are able to segment
their existing customer base between active and passive they can charge a much
higher price to passive consumers than if retention activity were banned (poA > p
o;NR
A ). As
said, note that rms will only try to retain customers when their customer base is above
a threshold. Firm A, for instance, will only o¤er retention discounts if 1 > 13 : When
we move from BBPD with no retention to BBPD with retention we nd that retained
customers are charged a higher price when 1 < 47 ; while they face a lower price when
1 >
4
7
. The intuition is the following. When 1 > 12 some consumers in rm As turf are
B-oriented consumers, thus rm A needs to price more aggressively if it wants to avoid
switching. Regarding rm As price to new customers (pnA) we nd that given rm Bs
retention o¤ers, rm A will need to be more aggressive with their headline price o¤ers
(prices for new customers) if it wants to convince customers to switch. Thus, the poaching
price (pn) with retention o¤ers is always below its counterpart when retention is absent.
Corollary 3. When rms have symmetric initial market shares they split equally the
market in the second-period. When 1 2

1
3
; 2
3

BBPD with retention strategies leads the
dominant rm to lose its dominance, that is s2A  12
 
s2B  12

if 1  12
 
1  12

: In
contrast, the bigger rm is able to maintain its dominance when the asymmetry in the
market is strong enough. Particularly, it follows that s2A  12
 
s2B  12

if 1 2

3
4
; 1

and
13
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Figure 2: Firm As second-period market share
s2A  12
 
s2B  12

if 1 2

0; 1
4

.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 3 plots rm As second period market share when it departs with an exogenous
inherited market share in the benchmark case of BBPD with no retention strategies s2;NRA
and in the case of BBPD with retention discounts, s2A. It conrms the ndings in Corollary
1 and 3. As seen before the bigger rm (initial market share higher than 50%) will always
lose its dominance under BBPD and no retention. Note also that for any 1  0:5; it is
always the case that s2A  s2;NRA .
In contrast, it is important to stress that when rms can try to retain their previous
clientele, BBPD can help the dominant rm to maintain its dominance, i.e., BBPD may
not destroy the dominance of the bigger rm. This happens when the initial market share
of the bigger rm is su¢ ciently high (i.e., higher than 75% of the market). If, for instance,
rm A departs with an initial market share of 90%, BBPD with retention activity will
reduce its second-period market share to 56%.
Figure 4 plots both rms second-period prots as a function of 1. It gives some
insight about the prot e¤ects of retention o¤ers if rms had initial asymmetric customer
bases. From a static point of view, as expected, we observe that the dominant rm earns
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higher prots than the smaller rm. With no retention activity, at the interior solution
(1
4
 1  34), we have that both rms make the same prot in the second period. With
retention strategies this is no longer the case because each rms prot increases with its
own initial market share. At the interior solution (1
3
 1  23) both rms earn the same
prot only when they are initially symmetric. For this reason when BBPD with retention
discounts are permitted, each rm has a strategic incentive to build up its rst-period
market share.
2
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2
Ap
2
Bp
2
Bp
2nd Period
Profits
A’s initial
market share
Figure 3: Second-period prots
4.2 First-period
Next we look at the equilibrium rst-period pricing and consumption decisions. Because
rms are forward looking they rationally anticipate how todays price decision will a¤ect
their second-period pricing and prots. Consumers are also sophisticated in the sense
that in equilibrium they correctly anticipate the rms second-period price discrimination
strategies.
Let rm As rst-period price be p1A and rm Bs rst-period price be p
1
B. The marginal
consumer in the rst period will surely switch in the second period to take advantage of
the poaching price. If rst-period prices lead to a cuto¤ 1; the consumer located at 1
is indi¤erent between buying from rm A in period 1 at price p1A and then buying from
rm B in period 2 at the poaching price pnB, or buying from rm B in period 1 at price
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p1B and then buying from rm A at the poaching price p
n
A. At an interior solution,
p1A + t1 +  (p
n
B + t (1  1)) = p1B + (1  1) t+  (pnA + t1) ;
thus
1 =
t+ p1B   p1A +  [pnA (1)  pnB (1)]
2t (1  ) :
Using the expressions for pnA and p
n
B dened in Proposition 3 it follows that
1 =
1
2
+
5 (p1B   p1A)
2t ( + 5)
: (10)
If price discrimination is not permitted or if  = 0; then @1
@p1A
=   1
2t
: Under BBPD with
retention strategies we have
@1
@p1A
=   1
2t
 

5
+ 1
 ; (11)
while under BBPD with no retention strategies we have
@1
@p1A
=   1
2t
 

3
+ 1
 :
Thus, as long as  > 0, with BBPD consumers react less to price reductions in the rst
period than they would in a static model of this kind. Additionally, it is straightforward to
see that demand will be less elastic in the rst period if BBPD is permitted but retention
o¤ers are not allowed.
Now consider the equilibrium choices of p1A and p
1
B. At an interior solution, rm A
and Bs overall objective function is, respectively, given by
p1A

1
2
+
5 (p1B   p1A)
2t ( + 5)

+ 

1
50
t

48
 
1
 
p1A; p
1
B
2   361  p1A; p1B+ 19 ; (12)
p1B

1
2
+
5 (p1A   p1B)
2t ( + 5)

+ 

1
50
t

48
 
1
 
p1A; p
1
B
2   60  1  p1A; p1B+ 31 : (13)
Substituting equation (10) into equations (12) and (13) it is straightforward to obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 4. There is a symmetric subgame perfect nash equilibrium in which:
(i) rst-period equilibrium prices are p1 = t
 
1  
25

and both rms share equally the
market in period 1;
(ii) second-period equilibrium prices are po = 4
5
t; d = 2
5
t and pn = 1
5
t:
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(iii) Consumers on the intervals

0; 1
5

and

4
5
; 1

show are not willing to switch,
consumers on the intervals

1
5
; 2
5

and

3
5
; 4
5

show an intention to switch but are retained,
and consumers on the intervals

2
5
; 3
5

show an intention to leave and do switch in spite
of being exposed to a retention o¤er.
(iv) Each rms second-period equilibrium prot is equal to 13
50
t, while the rst period
equilibrium prot equals t
2
 
1  
25

: Overall equilibrium prot under BBPD with retention
o¤ers is equal to t
50
(12 + 25) :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 4 highlights that the possibility of rm engaging in BBPD with retention
o¤ers under a LPL switching regime, leads to higher prices to all consumers that do not
switch (be they consumers that are not looking to switch or consumers that were success-
fully retained after they expressed a desire to switch by requesting a code) compared to
a GPL process. (Note po = 4
5
t > po;NR = 2
3
t and po  d = 2
5
t > pn;NR = 1
3
t:) In particular,
even consumers that obtain a lower price under retention end up paying a higher price
than they would in the absence of retention o¤ers under a GPL process. Regarding, the
consumers that do switch we nd that they actually get a lower price in a LPL switching
regime with retention o¤ers than they would in the absence of retention under a GPL
regime. This is because the o¤er of a retention discount implies that in order to induce
switching, it is necessary to o¤er very low prices to those consumers that are eager to
switch.
Regarding, rst-period prices an interesting nding is that the rst-period price with
BBPD and retention strategies is below the uniform price. This result should be com-
pared with rst-period equilibrium price above the uniform price when BBPD is used
without retention o¤ers. In general when rms can engage in price discrimination based
on purchase history there are two e¤ects on rst-period prices: a consumer-side e¤ect and
a rm-side e¤ect. When consumers are non myopic they correctly anticipate the second
period prices, become less price sensitive in period 1 and so there is a positive e¤ect on
rst-period prices. When rms are forward looking, they also take into account that a
change in rst-period prices will a¤ect the second-period prices and prots.
In the benchmark case of BBPD with no retention strategies a change of rst-period
prices has no e¤ect on second-period prot because with a uniform distribution a rms
marginal gains in the second-period market are exactly o¤set by losses in the rst-period
market ( @
2
@p1A
= 0): In this case the decrease in the price sensitivity of consumers in period
1 that occurs when we move from no discrimination to BBPD determines the result of
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rst-period prices above the non-discrimination level.
Looking at the e¤ect of rst-period prices on second-period prot when rms can
employ BBPD with retention o¤ers we nd that in the symmetric equilibrium @
2
@p1A
=
  3
5(+5)
< 0. This suggests that each rm has a strategic incentive to enlarge its turf in
period 1, which is achieved by competing more aggressively in that period. Therefore,
in comparison to no-discrimination, rms charge lower rst-period prices when they can
compete with BBPD and retention o¤ers because the rm-side e¤ect is stronger than the
consumer-side e¤ect.
5 Welfare analysis
This section investigates the welfare e¤ects of BBPD when rms engage in a retention
activity in an attempt to make it less attractive for a customer to switch to a competing
rm. We compare this possibility with two other price competition scenarios; the one
where price discrimination is not permitted and the other where BBPD is permitted but
retention o¤ers are not allowed. Let the superscript nd denote no discrimination; NR
denote BBPD with no retention activity and R denote BBPD with retention discounts.
Further, let ind denote industry prots, CS denote consumer surplus and W denote
overall welfare.
Proposition 5. For any  > 0 is is always true:
(i) ndind > 
NR
ind > 
R
ind
(ii) CSnd < CSNR < CSR
(iii) W nd > WR > WNR
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 highlights that in comparison to uniform pricing, price discrimination
based on purchase history is bad for prots and overall welfare but good for consumers.
However, conditional on BBPD being employed, the use of a retention strategy through a
price discount o¤ered to those consumers showing an intention to switch boosts consumer
surplus and overall welfare at the expense of industry prots.
In order to discuss the impact of retention o¤ers for specic groups of consumers let we
compare rst BBPD with no retention activity with uniform pricing. In the Fudenberg-
Tirole model with the uniform, price discrimination has no e¤ect on consumer welfare for
the consumers on the interval

0; 1
3

and

2
3
; 1

. These consumers do not switch in equi-
librium and their present value payment for the two periods of consumption is the same
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in both pricing regimes, i.e., (1 + ) t: In contrast, consumers on the interval

1
3
; 2
3

switch
from one rm to another and the present value of their payment is equal to (1 + ) t  t
3
:
In comparison to no discrimination, the group of switchers is strictly better o¤ under
BBPD with no retention strategies.
Look now at BBPD with retention o¤ers. Consumers on the intervals

0; 1
5

and

2
5
; 1

do not signal an intention to switch and as a result of that they face a higher second-period
price. Their present value payment for the two periods of consumption is (1 + ) t  6t
25
.
Thus, the decrease in the rst-period price more than compensates the second period
loss, implying that the group of passive consumers is strictly better o¤ with BBPD and
retention o¤ers than under no discrimination (where they pay (1 + ) t): Consumers on the
intervals

1
5
; 2
5

and

3
5
; 4
5

show an intention to switch but are retained. The present value
of the price paid by these consumers in both periods is (1 + ) t  16t
25
: These consumers
are also clearly better o¤when rms employ BBPD with retention discounts. Consumers
on the intervals

1
3
; 2
5

and

3
5
; 2
3

decide not to switch when we move from BBPD alone to
BBPD with retention o¤ers. The present value of their payment is equal to (1 + ) t  6t
25
with retention discounts, while it is equal to (1 + ) t  
3
t with no retention: Consequently,
this group of consumers also benets when rms employ BBPD and retention discounts.
Finally, the poached consumers on the interval

2
5
; 3
5

switch from one rm to another
under retention strategies. The present value of the price paid by them for the two
periods of consumption is equal to (1 + ) t  21t
25
:
Summing up, BBPD with retention strategies reduces the present value of the price
paid by consumer in all segments, explaining that the use of BBPD with retention dis-
counts under a LPL switching process can benet consumers in comparison to the case
where retention is absent under the GPL regime.
Regarding the aggregate e¤ects on welfare, because in the present model there is no role
for price discrimination to increase aggregate output, variations in welfare are uniquely
explained by the desutilitysupported by those consumers who buy ine¢ ciently.12 As
retention discounts are used by rms as an attempt to make it less attractive for a customer
to switch to a rival rm, a smaller number of consumers do in fact switch in equilibrium.
As a result of that in comparison to BBPD alone, BBPD with retention o¤ers boosts
welfare because it gives rise to less ine¢ cient switching.
12For a model where BBPD can a¤ect aggregate output see Esteves and Reggiani (2014).
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6 Conclusions
The economics literature on price discrimination by purchase history has hitherto focused
on the assumption that (i) rms have only the required information to price discriminate
between old and new customers and that (ii) rms have no way to react to the rivals
poaching o¤ers. Interestingly, in some of the markets where rms often price discriminate
between their own and the rivalsconsumers, the switching processes currently in place in
many countries have allowed rms to become aware of an existing customers willingness
to leave before the switching takes place. Consequently, rms have been increasingly able
to recognize di¤erent categories of old customers those willing to stay and those willing
to switch and try to raise the switching barriers by engaging in retention o¤ers.
This paper has taken a rst step in investigating the impact of behavior-based price
discrimination in markets where rms are allowed to try to retain their previous clientele,
by o¤ering those showing an intention to switch a price discount.
In order to understand the implications of these business practice in asymmetric mar-
kets, we had looked at the static second-period analysis. It highlights that rms will only
o¤er retention discounts if their customer base is above a threshold (i.e., above 33%).
Further, the static analysis also sheds some light on whether or not BBPD with retention
strategies in a LPL regime helps a dominant rm (with a market share above 50%) to
maintain its dominant position. If BBPD is possible but retention activity is forbidden,
the dominant rm will lose its dominance under price discrimination. In contrast, if the
dominant rm is big enough (with a market share above 75%), although BBPD with
retention o¤ers makes the market more competitive it allows the bigger rm to maintain
its dominance.
While the static analysis is a useful tool, the dynamic one is the most appropriate
to inform competition authorities about the economic e¤ects of BBPD with retention
o¤ers. Take into account the intertemporal e¤ects of BBPD with retention o¤ers, the
paper shows that the rst period equilibrium price with retention strategies is below its
non-discrimination counterpart, which contrasts with rst period price above the non-
discrimination level when these business strategies are forbidden. Regarding second-
period prices, the possibility of rm engaging in BBPD with retention o¤ers under a LPL
switching regime, leads to higher prices to all consumers that do not switch compared
to a GPL process. In contrast, the consumers that do switch get a lower price in a LPL
switching regime with retention o¤ers than they would in the absence of retention under
a GPL regime. In spite of this, we show that the present value of the price paid by
consumers who do not switch is lower under BBPD with retention o¤ers under a LPL
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switching regime than when it is banned, suggesting that the higher second-period prices
are more than compensated by the lower rst-period price. In sum the paper shows that
BBPD with retention strategies under a LPL switching regime, can reduce the present
value of the price paid by consumers in all segments, compared to BBPD with no retention
(GLP regime).
As in other models where consumers have stable exogenous brand preferences, in
comparison to uniform pricing the instrument of BBPD is bad for prots and welfare but
good for consumers. The model predicts that industry prots are lower and consumers
surplus and welfare is higher under LPL with retention o¤ers than under GPL without
retention activity.
However, it is important to stress that the results obtained in this model should be
interpreted with care. Like other models of BBPD, the model has some limitations. One
limitation is the unit demand assumption.13 In these models, output is constant whatever
the pricing policy (discriminatory or uniform) and the price levels. Prices only a¤ect how
the total surplus available in the economy is shared between consumers and rms. A pric-
ing policy that generates more switching will yield a lower welfare. As the present model
predicts that the present value of the price paid by all consumer segments decreases with
retention activity, extending the model by relaxing the unit demand assumption would
produce the same qualitative welfare results. Another limitation is the assumption of
preferences uniformly distributed. Extending the model to other distribution of consumer
preferences would produce insights about the e¤ects of BBPD and retention o¤ers in mar-
kets characterized by a large tail of consumers with preferences for one of the rms and a
small tail of consumers with preferences for the other rm. It is likely in this scenario in-
dustry prots may be higher and consumerssurplus may be lower under retention o¤ers.
It is therefore important to get a better understanding of brand loyalty and consumer
inertia, in the markets under consideration if we are to gain a better understanding of the
distribution of consumerspreference.
Finally, this model assumed that rms o¤er the same discount to all consumers ex-
pressing an intention to leave. In practice, rms o¤er di¤erent discounts to consumers
and these may be the outcome of a bargaining processwhich may be inuenced by the
consumers level of brand loyalty.
Notwithstanding the model addressed in this paper is far from covering all complex
aspects of real markets, it has tried to o¤er a closer approximation of reality where rms
have increasingly more consumer information to react to the rivalspoaching o¤ers. Al-
13It would be interesting to explore retention o¤ers in Esteves and Regiani (2014) framework.
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though any advice to a policy agency should take into account the features of each market,
in those markets that could be reasonably well represented by the features of the current
model, restrictions on the ability of rms to employ retention o¤ers through under a LPL
switching process would benet industry prots at the expense of consumer welfare.
A Proofs
Some of the proofs in this technical appendix need to be improved.
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider second-period competition in rm As rst pe-
riod customer base [0; 1]. Let poA represent rm As price to its previous customers and
pnB rm Bs poaching price.
The indi¤erent consumer between buying again from A at price poA and switching to
B and pay pnB is located at A such that
poA + tA = p
n
B + t (1  A)
A =
1
2
+
pnB   poA
2t
: (14)
This implies that at prices poA; p
n
B; consumers on the interval [0; A] have a strong pref-
erence from A and buy again product A. Di¤erently, consumers on the interval [A; 1]
switch from A to B. Using similar arguments it is straightforward to show that in Bs turf
the indi¤erent consumer between staying with B and switching to A is located at
B =
1
2
+
poB   pnA
2t
: (15)
Thus, consumers on the interval [1; B] switch from B to A and consumers on the interval
[B; 1] buy again from B. In As turf, each rm solves the following problem
Max
poA

poA

1
2
+
pnB   poA
2t

;
Max
pnB

pnB

1   1
2
  p
n
B   poA
2t

:
Firm As best response is
poA =
1
2
t+
1
2
pnB
and rm Bs best response is
pnB =
1
2
poA  
1
2
t+ t1:
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It thus follows that
poA =
1
3
t (21 + 1)
pnB =
1
3
t (41   1) :
It is straightforward to obtain that the equilibrium prices in turf B are
poB =
1
3
t (3  21)
pnA =
1
3
t (3  41) :
Note however that it is a dominated strategy for each rm to quote a poaching price
below the marginal cost, which in this case is equal to zero. From pnB  0 it must be
true that 1  14 : Otherwise, i.e., when 1  14 it follows that pnB = 0; and and so rm
As best response in order no to lose the marginal consumer located at 1 is to quote
poA + t1 = t (1  1) ; from which we obtain poA = t (1  21) : Thus, when 1  14 second-
period equilibrium prices are
poA = t (1  21) ; pnA =
1
3
t (3  41) ; (16)
poB =
1
3
t (3  21) ; pnB = 0: (17)
Similarly it is straightforward to nd that if 1  34
poA =
1
3
t (21 + 1) ; p
n
A = 0
poB = t(21   1); pnB =
1
3
t (41   1) :
This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. From these second-period equilibrium prices it is easy to
obtain that each rm second-period market share, s2A and s
2
B. At the interior solution
1 2

1
4
; 3
4

s2A =
2  1
3
and s2B =
1 + 1
3
;
When 1 2

0; 1
4

s2A =
21 + 3
6
and s2B =
3  21
6
;
When 1 2

3
4
; 1

s2A =
1
6
(21 + 1) and s2B =
1
6
(5  21) :
23
Straightforward computations prove that when 1 2

1
4
; 3
4

; s2A >
1
2
 
s2B <
1
2

i¤ 1 < 12
while s2A <
1
2
 
s2B <
1
2

i¤ i¤ 1 > 12 : On the interval 1 2

0; 1
4

; s2A >
1
2
 
s2B <
1
2

i¤
1 > 0; which is always true. Finally, when 1 2

3
4
; 1

it follows that s2A <
1
2
 
s2B >
1
2

i¤
1 < 1 which is always true.
Proof of Proposition 3. Look rst at rm As turf. Given that in the second stage
of period 2 rm A o¤ers a discount dA =
poA
2
to consumers showing an intention to leave
rm B anticipates this Behavior and solves the following problem in the rst stage of
period 2:
Max
pnB
nB = p
n
B

1   1
2
  p
n
B   poA + dA
2t

s.t. d =
poA
2
From the FOC we obtain:
pn =
1
4
poA  
1
2
t+ t1:
In the rst stage of period 2 rm A solves the following problem:
Max
poA
fpoAxcA + (poA   dA)(xA   xcA)g
from which we obtain:
poA =
2
3
t+
2
3
pnB: (18)
Thus,
poA =
2
5
t (21 + 1) ; (19)
dA =
1
5
t (21 + 1) ; (20)
pnB =
2
5
t (31   1) as long as 1 > 1
3
(21)
Note that if 1  13 ; pnB = 0 and so the best response of rm A is to quote poA =
t (1  21) :
In the group of rm Bs past consumers there is group of consumers who might be
induced to switch given poA and p
n
B: Under Losing Provider Led this consumers will contact
rm B as a way to switch to A. Given this contact rm B o¤ers a discount d as a way to
retain these customers. The indi¤erent consumer between buying again from B at price
poB   d and switching to A is located at xB:
pnA + tB = p
o
B + t (1  B)  d
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from which we obtain
B =
1
2
+
poB   pnA   dB
2t
:
Note that the indi¤erent consumer between contacting rm B is located at cB such that:
U(poB; d = 0)  U(pnA)
poB + t(1  cB) = pnA + tcB
cB =
1
2
+
poB   pnA
2t
:
Thus in the second stage rm B solves the following problem
Max (poB   dB) (cB   B)
From the FOC it follows that dB =
poB
2
:
In the rst stage of period 2 rm A solves the following problem:
Max
pnA
nA = p
n
A (B   1) s.t. dB =
poB
2
From the FOC we have that
pnA =
1
2
t+
1
4
poB   t1:
In the rst stage of period 2 rm B solves the following problem:
Max
poB
fpoB (1  cB) + (poB   dB)(cB   B)g
It follows that
poB =
2
5
t (3  21)
poB   dB =
1
5
t (3  21)
pnA =
2
5
t (2  31) for 1 < 2
3
:
If 1  23 it follows that pnA = 0 and so the best response of rm B is to charge
poB = t(21   1):
Proof of Corollary 5. From the second-period equilibrium prices it is easy to obtain
that second-period market shares are at the interior solution where 1
3
 1  23 given by
s2A = A + (B   1) =
3
5
  1
5
1
s2B = 1  s2A =
2 + 1
5
:
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In this case it follows that s2A  12
 
s2B  12

i¤ 1  12 :
When 1 2

0; 1
3

s2A = B =
21 + 2
5
s2B = 1  s2A =
3  21
5
:
Thus,
s2A 
1
2

s2B 
1
2

i¤ 1 2

0;
1
4

;
s2A 
1
2

s2B 
1
2

i¤ 1 2

1
4
;
1
3

:
Finally when 1 2

2
3
; 1

:
s2A = A =
21 + 1
5
s2B = 1  s2A =
2 (2  1)
5
:
Therefore,
s2A 
1
2

s2B 
1
2

i¤ 1 2

3
4
; 1

s2A 
1
2

s2B 
1
2

i¤ 1 2

2
3
;
3
4

:

Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the equilibrium choices of p1A and p
1
B. Firm As
and Bs overall objective function are respectively
p1A1
 
p1A; p
1
B

+
t
50

48
 
1
 
p1A; p
1
B
2   361  p1A; p1B+ 19
and
p1B
 
1  1
 
p1A; p
1
B

+
t
50

48
 
1
 
p1A; p
1
B
2   60  1  p1A; p1B+ 31 :
Thus from the FOC with respect to p1A and p
1
B we obtain rms A and B best-response
functions respectively given by
p1A
 
p1B

=
125t+ 125p1B + 20t   95p1B   t2
250  70 ; (22)
26
and
p1B
 
p1A

=
125t+ 125p1A + 20t   95p1A   t2
250  70 (23)
from which we obtain
p1A = p
1
B = t

1  
25

:
Second-order condition for this problem is given by 7 25
t(+5)2
which is negative for all
 2 [0; 1] :
Proof of Proposition 5. The rst-period equilibrium outcome is e¢ cient under
uniform pricing and under BBPD with and without retention strategies. Specically,
overall welfare in period 1 is equal to v   t
4
in the three pricing regimes. In the second-
period welfare with no discrimination, w2nd is
w2nd = v  
Z 1
2
0
txdx 
Z 1
1
2
t(1  x)dx = v   t
4
:
With BBPD and retention discounts, the second-period welfare is w2
w2 = v  
Z A
0
txdx 
Z 1
A
t(1  x)dx 
Z B
1
txdx 
Z 1
B
t(1  x)dx
= v   27t
100
:
When rms engage in BBPD but retention o¤ers are not permitted, the second period
welfare is w2;NR given by
w2;NR = v  
Z 1
3
1+
1
6
0
txdx 
Z 1
1
3
1+
1
6
t(1  x)dx 
Z 5
6
  1
3
1
1
txdx 
Z 1
5
6
  1
3
1
t(1  x)dx
= v   11t
36
:
Overall welfare in both periods, given by W = w1 + w2; with no discrimination is given
by
W nd = v (1 + )  0:25t  0:25t
while under BBPD with retention discounts it equals
WR = v (1 + )  0:25t  0:27t;
and, with BBPD and no retention o¤ers it equals
WNR = v (1 + )  0:25t  0:30556t:
27
Industry prots with no discrimination are equal to ndind = t + t: From part (iv) of
Proposition 4 it follows that industry prot under BBPD with retention activity is
Rind =
t (12 + 25)
25
while with no retention o¤ers it is equal to
NRind =
t (9 + 8)
9
Overall consumer surplus in each of the three pricing regimes is respectively given by
CSnd = v(1 + )  1:25t  1:25t
CSR = v(1 + )  1:25t  0:75t
CSNR = v(1 + )  1:25t  1:1945t
Thus, for any  > 0; it is straightforward to obtain (i), (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 5.

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